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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
\ Appeal No. 20061016-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L NO MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED 
WHEN ATTACKING THE COURT'S CONCLUSION 
In its Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that Appellant did not 
meet the requirements to marshal the evidence. Brief of Appellee at p. 5. The 
State is mistaken in this argument. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states in pertinent part that, "[a] party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." Ibid, (emphasis added). In State v. Curry, the standard for reviewing the 
denial of a motion to suppress is stated as follows, "[t]his Court reviews the 
'factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence' under a 'clearly-erroneous standard,' and this Court reviews 
the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness." Ibid. 2006 UT App 390, | 5 , 
147 P.3d 483, citing State v. Peterson. 2003 UT App 300, 1 7, 77 P.3d 646 
(quotations and citation omitted), ajfd, 2005 UT 17, 110 P.3d 699. However, this 
Court "afford[s] no deference to the trial court's application of the law to the 
underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases." Id., see also State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
Marshaling may be required in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at trial as they pertain to the facts found by the trial court, however, no 
such requirements exists and the State cites to no authority respecting marshaling 
in a challenge to a trial court's erroneous denial of a suppression motion under the 
Fourth Amendment. Should Rodriguez's argument be construed by this Court as a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the hearing on the Motion, however, 
and it be determined that marshaling is necessary, the Statement of Facts set forth 
in Rodriguez's opening brief adequately set forth all the evidence presented by the 
three (3) witnesses in this matter and Rodriguez's threshold requirement for 
marshaling has thus been met. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently undertook an extensive analysis that 
lends support for Rodriguez's position that marshaling should not be required as it 
pertains to the issues raised by Rodriguez in his opening brief in this matter, since 
the challenges contained therein pertain to the trial court's determination as to 
whether reasonable suspicion existed with respect to the stop of Rodriguez's 
vehicle by Adams. The Utah Supreme Court's analysis pertained to the standard 
of review appropriate for such determination, stating as follows: 
At issue in rState v. Pena,] was the proper standard by which to 
review a trial court's determination of whether a police stop was 
? 
supported by reasonable suspicion. [Ibid, 869 P.2d 932, 934-35 
(Utah 1994)]. The issue presented a classic mixed question of law 
and fact. Id. The circumstances surrounding Mr. Pena's detention 
were factual. Id. The concept of reasonable suspicion was legal. Id. 
The application of the reasonable suspicion standard to the 
circumstances of Mr. Pena's detention intertwined both elements. Id. 
at 936. 
The focus of our inquiry in Pena was where to place the reasonable 
suspicion inquiry on the fact versus law continuum. Id. at 939. 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, Tf75-76, 130 P.3d 325. In Pena. the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically stated that, "[w]e conclude that the proper standard of 
review to be applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific set of facts 
gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a fact determination 
reviewable for clear error." Pena at 939. The Court adopted a four-part test in 
Pena for determinations as to the standards of review for mixed questions of fact 
and law; however, the test was later found to be confusing and a new test was 
recently adopted in State v. Levin. 2006 UT 50, f25, 144 P.3d 1096, as follows: 
Our revised test considers the following factors: (1) the degree of 
variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal 
rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate 
courts;" and (3) other "policy reasons that weigh for or against 
granting discretion to trial courts." 
Ibid 
As it pertains to the first Levin factor pertaining to the degree of variety and 
complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied, ". . .the greater the 
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complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case for appellate deference." 
Levin at f26. The facts favorable to a conclusion that a level-2 Terry stop has 
occurred requiring an officer to have reasonable suspicion to stop are that Adams 
pulled his car in front of Rodriguez's, made a visual gesture with his hand to stop, 
all the while intending to try and stop him, drove up beside Rodriguez and rolled 
his window down to speak with Rodriguez. Since some of the facts, if found to be 
a lawful command of a police officer, could likely have resulted in a third degree 
felony charge for Rodriguez if he chose to ignore them. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-
6a-209(l)(a). These facts appear to be particular to this matter since counsel 
herein was unable to locate much case law on these particular facts, which 
evidence their complexity and support appellate deference. 
"As to the second [factor], the greater the importance of a trial court's 
credibility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the 
stronger the case for appellate deference." Levin at f26. Although the parties' 
accounts of what occurred differ in this matter, giving rise to credibility 
determinations, the issue challenged before this Court does not hinge on the 
credibility determination. Rodriguez has adopted the facts as sufficient and 
challenges the trial court's conclusions of law that the encounter was a level-1 
Terry stop, even with the facts as found by the trial court. 
As it pertains to the third Levin factor, the Utah Court of Appeals set forth 
as follows: 
The third factor requires that we take into consideration policy 
factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied. 
A 
Even where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first 
two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit 
that deference. 
There exist no policy considerations that relate to the degree of deference that 
should be applied in the instant matter. Thus, no policy considerations would lead 
this Court to limit the deference it may otherwise exercise in mixed questions on 
review. Having sufficiently met the Levin factors evidencing that the instant 
matter as a challenge to the conclusions of law, not requiring marshaling, and 
requiring a standard of review conducive to Pena, supra, the matter can clearly be 
determined by this Court under a correctness standard. 
As indicated supra, Rodriguez adopted the finding of the facts as presented 
in this matter and articulated them in detail in the Statement of Facts section found 
on pages 10-11 of the opening brief. Rodriguez is arguing against the trial court's 
conclusion that his encounter with Adams was a level one (1) Terry encounter. In 
order for the Appellant to make his argument against the trial court's conclusion it 
was necessary for him to reargue the evidence showing how the encounter was not 
a level one stop. 
As is stated supra under UTAH .R .APP. P. 24(a)(9), marshaling the 
evidence is only necessary when challenging a finding of fact, (emphasis added). 
The findings of fact in this matter are not being challenged, only the conclusions 
made by the trial court. Therefore, because it is the conclusions which the 
Appellant is challenging and not the finding of fact marshaling was not required. 
IL DEPUTY ADAMS STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS A 
SEIZURE 
5 
The United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle and etaining it 
occupants constitutes a seizure, stating as follows: 
"[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 
'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] 
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); accord State v. 
Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App.1992); see Terry v. Ohio . 
392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994). "[A] seizure under the 
fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the 
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." State v. Jackson, 805 
P.2d 765, 767, (Utah App. 1990) citing. United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 
544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 
"A person is seized only when that person has an objective reason to 
believe he or she is not free to end the conversation with the officer and proceed 
on his or her way." United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th 
Cir.1996). The defendant's subjective belief that she was not free to leave is not 
determinative. "The correct test is whether a reasonable person in [the defendant's] 
position would believe [she] was not free to leave." Id. at 1499. U.S. v. Torres-
Guevara. 147 F.3d 1261, C.A.10 (Utah), 1998. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-209(l)(a) clearly states that, "[a] person may not 
willfully fail or willfully refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of a; 
(a) peace officer." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210 states in part: "An operator who 
receives a visual or audible signal jfrom a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a 
stop may not: (i) operate the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so 
as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or (ii) 
attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means, (emphasis 
added). 
While the lesser offense of disobeying a peace officer requires 
"willful" conduct in order to meet the requisite level of culpability 
under section 41-6-13, (now 41-6a-209) the greater offense of 
fleeing or eluding a peace officer requires "willful or wanton 
disregard" on the part of the driver in order to violate section 41-6-
13.5. "Wanton" is not defined for purposes of this statute, but it is 
commonly thought of as "[rjeckless, heedless, malicious; 
characterized by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness; recklessly 
disregardful of... consequences." Black's Law Dictionary 1582 (6th 
ed. 1990). Our supreme court addressed the meaning of the phrase 
"wanton or reckless disregard" as it appeared in a criminal statute. 
See State v. Johnson. 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961). 
According to Johnson, the phrase "connotes the generally accepted 
meaning of 'criminal negligence.' " Id. at 221, 364 P.2d at 1019. 
Under section 76-2-103(4) of the Utah Code, a person is criminally 
negligent "when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances [surrounding his conduct] 
exist or the result [of his conduct] will occur." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-2-103(4) (1990). 
State v.Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 713, (Utah App. 1995). 
In the instant matter, Adams stop of Rodriguez constituted a seizure. 
Adams saw the Rodriguez vehicle, was "curious" and decided to check it out, and 
headed down the road. Adams pulled his patrol car up alongside Rodriguez, made 
a gesture with his hand that was a raise of his hand with the palm facing upward, 
had his window down, began speaking to Rodriguez, and got out of his vehicle to 
do so. It is apparent that, because Adams waved at Rodriguez and had his window 
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rolled down as he approached the vehicle, he intended to have Rodriguez stop so 
he could speak with him. 
At the hearing on the suppression motion in this matter, Adams testified 
that he '*waved to see if he was going to stop. Some people just go by. I was going 
to just see if everything was all right." Tr. at p 14. When asked to show how he 
waved, the officer demonstrated holding up his hand with his palm upward. Tr. at 
p. 15. It is clear by Adams' testimony that he made a visual signal to Rodriguez 
and that it was his intention for Rodriguez to stop based on that visual signal. 
Rodriguez stopped based upon that signal and spoke to Adams and Rodriguez did 
not feel like he could just end the conversation and be on his way. As is stated 
supra in UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210, a person who receives a visual signal from 
a police officer is required to stop or they may be charged with a third degree 
felony. Under the law, Rodriguez was required to stop when he was waved at by 
Adams. 
At the hearing on the suppression motion in this matter, the trial court 
concluded that the testimony of Adams was more credible. The trial court 
assumed that, if someone was stopped by a police officer, the first thing they 
would say is "why was I stopped?" and not just provide an explanation that they 
were okay and just getting some water. The trial court did not believe it was a 
level two Terry stop and did not believe that Adams had blocked their lane of 
travel; however, it did concede that Adams may have, at most, crossed their lane 
of traffic and then pulled up side by side with them. Tr. at pp. 48-50. The trial 
court indicated that they believed that Adams only raised his hand at Rodriguez 
and did nothing more. Id. 
"There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists. 
State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991). Rather, courts must look at 
the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 
S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Accord State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 
827; Steward. 806 P.2d at 215. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, (Utah App.,1993). 
However, when making its ruling in this matter, the trial court did not look at the 
totality of the circumstances pertaining to the reasonable person issue. Adams 
crossing their lane of travel for even a fraction of a second, to pull up alongside 
them, evidences that he blocked their lane of travel as they were trying to leave, 
requiring them to stop. As he pulled up alongside Rodriguez's vehicle, he made a 
visual gesture with his hand as if to stop him and engaged Rodriguez in 
conversation. It is clear that this matter was a seizure since a reasonable person 
would not feel as though they could drive off based upon the totality of the facts 
surrounding the stop that occurred in this matter. 
The trial court also concluded that they felt as though Adams raised hand 
was like an officer knocking on a door to see if someone is suspected of growing 
marijuana. The court concluded that any citizen can knock on your door to see if 
you are growing marijuana or pull up beside your vehicle and that if any citizen 
can do that so can police officers. However, the trial court erred in its conclusion, 
since police officers are held to a different standard than are normal citizens. 
Police officers may be able to approach you on the street and ask you a few 
questions or do a pat-down search, however, they are precluded jfrom stopping a 
vehicle without the requisite reasonable suspicion, A lack of reasonable suspicion 
in this regard warrants exercise of the exclusionary rule set forth in the U.S. 
CONST. AMEND IV. State v. Fridleifson. 2002 UT App 322, 18, 57 P.3d 1098. 
III. RODRIGUEZ DID NOT FEEL FREE TO LEAVE AFTER HE 
STOPPED, MAKING THIS A LEVEL TWO ENCOUNTER 
In State v. Tehero, this Court held as follows: 
Under our case law, there are three permissible levels of police 
stops: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and 
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense had been committed or is being 
committed.5' 
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, If 10 n. 1, 112 P.3d 507 (omission in 
original) (quotations and citation omitted). A level one encounter is 
a voluntary encounter during which a citizen may choose to answer a 
police officer's questions but is free to leave at any time during the 
questioning. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 11, 998 
P.2d 274. " As long as the person remains free to disregard the 
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that 
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require 
some particularized and objective justification.9 " Id. {quoting State 
v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)) (additional 
quotations and citation omitted). In contrast, a person is seized in a 
level two stop, and thus afforded the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, when the officer by means of physical force or show of 
authority has in some way restrained the liberty of [the] person." 
(quotations and citations omitted). A level one encounter becomes a 
level two seizure when "a reasonable person, in view of all the 
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This is 
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true even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention brief." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
Circumstances demonstrating that a level two stop is underway 
include the presence of more than one officer, the display of an 
officer's weapon, physical touching of the person, use of 
commanding language or tone of voice, and retaining a person's 
identification or other documentation. See id. 
Ibid, 2006 UT App 419 f6, 147 P.3d 506. This Court has also indicated as 
follows: 
A level two stop occurs when, in an encounter between a citizen and 
law enforcement officers, " 'a reasonable person, in view of all the 
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave.' " State 
v. Rav, 2000 UT App 55,f 11, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. 
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)). Such a detention is 
constitutionally permissible when the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to believe a person "has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, - - , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 LJEd.2d 740 (2002). 
State v. Fridleifson. 2002 UT App 322,18, 57 P.3d 1098. In State v. Fridleifson. 
this Court stated as follows with respect to the requisite reasonable suspicion 
necessary in a level two stop: 
[A] level two stop ... must be supported by reasonable suspicion [or 
it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
While the required level of suspicion is lower than the standard 
required for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and 
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 
specific and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion. In 
determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus 
necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately 
before the stop. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at If 18, 998 P.2d 274 
(citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original). 
Ibid, 2002 UT App 322,1J8, 57 P.3d 1098. More recently, this Court undertook a 
further analysis of this issue, stating as follows: 
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A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant is involved in criminal activity." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994), citing UTAH CODE ANN, § 77-7-15 
(1990); see also, State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam) (stating police must base reasonable suspicion on 
objective facts indicating defendant's criminal activity). "While the 
required level of suspicion is lower than the standard required for 
probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances 
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and 
articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." Case, supra, 
citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880; see United States v. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1989); accord State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1994); 
Sickling, 844 P.2d at 983. 
In general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support 
reasonable suspicion are ... based on an investigating officer's own 
observations and inferences." at 1276-77. Reasonable suspicion is 'a 
particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the person stopped 
of criminal activity," United States v. Tibbetts. 396 F.3d 1132, 
1138,(10th Cir. 2005) and whether or not a detention is supported by 
reasonable suspicion is determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances, not through an examination of each individual fact. 
See State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95,f 38, 103 P.3d 699 (concluding that 
the totality of the circumstances did not support a police officer's 
warrantless search of the interior of an automobile for weapons). In 
the case of a traffic stop, such an action is reasonable and the initial 
seizure will be found to be sound if the defendant commits a traffic 
offense in the officers presence, see State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 
t 30, 63 P.3d 650, or if the officer has an articulable reasonable 
suspicion' that [the defendant has] violated any one of the multitude 
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the 
jurisdiction.'Tibbetts, 396 F.3d at 1137 (citation omitted). 
State v. Yazzie 2005 UT App 261, f7, (Utah App.,2005). In Latta v. Kervte. our 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals similarly analyzed an investigative detention and its 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment by determining as follows: 
[w]e must determine whether the officer has reasonable suspicion to 
detain the individual. [Terry v.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]. Reasonable suspicion "requires 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 
the evidence, but something more than an inchoate and 
19 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. Melendez-
Garcia 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotations 
omitted). The officer must be "able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1,21, 88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Ibid., 118 F.3d 693,699, (C.A.10 (N.M.) 1997). 
"There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists. 
State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991). Rather, courts must look at 
the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 
S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Accord State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 
827; Steward. 806 P.2d at 215. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, (Utah App.,1993). 
In the instant matter, once Rodriguez had stopped, he did not feel free to 
leave the scene without speaking and complying with Adams' request. At the 
hearing, Rodriguez and his wife testified as to how they felt when they were 
stopped by Adams. Both Rodriguez and his wife testified that Adams waved to 
them, which they perceived to be for them to stop, and made eye contact with 
Rodriguez. Tr. at pp. 21 and 35. Rodriguez stated that, "[h]e made eye contact 
with me right there and made a hand gesture — of stopping. It wasn't a hi how are 
you, it was a stop movement." Tr. at p. 35. When asked what he was thinking 
when he saw that hand gesture, defendant stated: "I was thinking I was being 
stopped. It was apparent to me that the hand gesture and the angle of the vehicle 
was, was a forceful..." Tr. at p. 35. Defendant rolled down his window about 
seven inches or so and said, "We're okay I just stopped for some water." At that 
point he just continued to stare at me. And exited his vehicle very quickly and 
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grabbed a hold of my door, opened it up and told me to step out of the vehicle. Tr. 
at p. 37. 
This evidence was presented in Rodriguez's opening brief to show that, 
based upon the totality of the circumstances, Rodriguez did not feel free to leave 
once they received the visual signal from Adams, and additionally for fear of other 
criminal repercussions codified at UTAH CODE ANN.§ 41-6a-210. Brief of 
Appellant at p. 17. Rodriguez is not challenging the trial court's determination of 
Adams credibility, but rather is merely showing how Rodriguez and his wife felt 
in order to show that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the 
scene. In order for this Court to know how Rodriguez and his wife were feeling it 
was necessary for Rodriguez to reiterate the testimony given at the hearing 
because there was no other evidence presented that would have shown how they 
felt. 
Rodriguez does not challenge the trial court's determination that he and his 
wife were less credible than the Adams in this matter, instead they were simply 
using the totality of the circumstances test and their testimony to show that they 
did not feel free to leave the scene once Adams used a visual signal to stop them. 
Adams then engaged them in conversation and ultimately ordered Rodriguez out 
of the vehicle. Any person in this matter would not feel that they were free to just 
walk away, particularly when a police officer provides you with a visual signal to 
stop, rolls down his window, engages in conversation with the driver, and then 
asks the driver to step out of the vehicle. Rodriguez was merely using the totality 
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of the circumstances and his testimony to evidence how a reasonable person would 
not feel like they could just walk away from Adams. 
Although the trial court concluded that the stop of Rodriguez was not a 
level two (2) stop, the trial court failed to undertake an examination as to the 
totality of the circumstances in this matter. For an encounter to rise to a level two 
(2) Terry stop, a reasonable person must feel like they are not free to just walk 
away from the detention. In this matter, given the totality of the circumstances 
and the testimony of Rodriguez about how he was feeling after he stopped, it is 
clear that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 
Rodriguez's travel had been blocked by Adams crossing their land of 
traffic, Adams had given Rodriguez a visual signal, Adams' window was rolled 
down, he engaged Rodriguez in conversation, and got out of his vehicle to 
continuing speaking with Rodriguez. A reasonable person in this situation would 
not feel free to leave. If a police officer approaches a person, gives them a visual 
signal, has their window rolled down, begins speaking to them, and then exits their 
vehicle to continue talking to them, that person is not going to feel like they can 
just end the conversation and leave, but rather they will likely feel as though they 
must finish speaking to the officer. The encounter in this matter became a level 
two (2) stop because Rodriguez did not feel like he could just leave the scene and 
disregard Adams' visual signals to stop. Based upon the totality of the 
circumstances and because Rodriguez did not feel like he could just leave the 
encounter was a level two (2) stop. 
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Appellant agrees with all findings of fact presented in this matter and 
merely challenges the trial court's conclusions of law in this matter. Based upon 
the totality of the circumstances in this matter, a seizure of Rodriguez by Adams 
occurred. Where a seizure occurs, a level two (2) Tecry encounter occurs, The 
trial court erroneously determined that the encounter between Rodriguez and 
Adams in this matter was a level one (1) Tsnx stop negating the need for 
reasonable suspicion on Adams part for the stop that was conducted. The 
evidence as found by the trial court clearly indicates that this was a level two (2) 
encounter and that such encounter thus necessitated a finding with respect to 
whether reasonable suspicion existed. Rodriguez lias argued in bis upaoing brief 
and supra herein m favor of a finding that no reasonable suspicion existed at the 
time of the stop and that the evidence obtained as a result thereof should have been 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Rodriguez respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's Judgment, and enter such other and farther relief 
it deems necessary. 
DATKD THIS V?* day or June, 2007. 
Rodriguez 
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